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Withholding Food and Water from
a Patient-Should it be Condoned
in California?
I will prescribe regimen for the good of my patients according
to my ability and my judgment and never do harm to anyone.

From the Hippocratic Oath
Courts long have recognized the right of a hospitalized patient
to refuse medical treatment.' Courts also have declared that a close
family member or guardian vicariously may assert a patient's right
to refuse medical treatment if the patient is incompetent or comatose. 2
Recently, however, courts have been presented with the issues of
whether a hospitalized patient has the right to refuse food and water
and whether a guardian may assert that right on behalf of the
hospitalized patient.3
In Barber v. Superior Court," two physicians were charged with

murder for removing the intravenous tubes supplying nutrition and

hydration 5 to a comatose patient.6 The patient died from dehydra-

tion six days after the tubes were removed. 7 The California Court
of Appeal issued a writ of prohibition restraining the Superior Court
from taking action on the murder charges.' On the facts presented, 9

the court declared that intravenous administration of food and water
was the legal equivalent of the administration of other medical life1. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd
379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1978); In re Melideo, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (Sup. Ct. 1976); In re Osborne,
294 A.2d 372, 375-76 (D.C. 1972); In re Brooks' Estate, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442-43 (Ill. 1965).
2. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 270 N.E.2d 417,
419-20, 435 (Mass. 1977); In re Schiller, 372 A.2d 360, 366-67 (N.J. 1977); In re Quinlan,
355 A.2d 647, 671-72 (N.J. 1976).
3. See In re Conroy, 464 A.2d 303, 304 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), certification granted,
470 A.2d 418 (N.J. 1983); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1011, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484, 490 (1983).
4. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
5. Hydration is the administration of water to a patient. STEDrM'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY
660 (23d ed. 1976).
6. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
7. Cox, Justices Dismiss Murder Charges Against Doctors, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 13, 1983,
at 1, col. 2.
8. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
9. For a discussion of the relevant facts and circumstances presented in Barber, see infra
notes 59-80 and accompanying text.
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support systems.'" Since a doctor legally may remove life-support
equipment,'" and since Barber declared that food and water was the
same as other life-support systems,' 2 a doctor may remove intravenous
tubes at the request of the patient's family without fear of criminal
liability. II
Although Barber was a criminal case,'I the rationale of the court
may be extended to a situation in which a civil court is requested
to authorize the removal of nasogastric' 5 or intravenous feeding tubes
from a comatose or otherwise incompetent patient.' 6 This author
presents the argument, however, that because the administration of
food and water is inherently different from the administration of
medical treatment' 7 a hospital is obligated to provide nourishment
to patients, regardless of the obligation, or lack thereof, to provide

them with medical treatment.'" Although a patient has a right to refuse
medical treatment,' 9 he does not have a comparable right to refuse
food and water. Refusal of food and water by either the hospitalized
patient or his surrogate is suicide 20 and should not be condoned by
the courts. This author takes the position, therefore, that Barbershould
not be used as precedent in a civil case to permit food and water
to be withdrawn from a living patient.2 ' An analysis of the distinction between the administration of food and water and the administration of medical care begins with an examination of the right of a
patient or his surrogate to refuse medical treatment.

10. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
11. In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 367-68, 372 (Fla. 1984); John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984). See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,
662-64, 672 (N.J. 1976).
12. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
13. Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493-94.
14. Id. at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
15. Nasogastric tubes enter the stomach through the nose and carry food or water to the
patient. DoRLuMD's MEDICAL DicTioARY 868 (26th ed. 1981).
16. An example of a guardian petitioning a court to permit the removal of feeding tubes
from an incompetent patient is In re Conroy, 464 A.2d 303 (N.J. Super, Ct. App. Div.), certification granted, 470 A.2d 418 (N.J. 1983). The court refused to allow the guardian to remove
the feeding tubes. Id. at 315. For a discussion of the implications of In re Conroy, see infra
notes 117-35 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 155-79 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 84-154 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 25-56 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Von Holden v. Chapman, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625 (1982).
21. Only the implications of the withdrawal of food and water from a living patient will
be discussed in this comment. For a discussion of the implications of the removal of life support from a brain dead patient, see Dority v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. App. 3d 273, 276-77,
280-81, 193 Cal. Rptr. 289, 291-92 (1983).

1985 / Withholding Foodfrom a Patient
THE

RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT

In California, two bases exist by which a patient may refuse medical
treatment; the California Natural Death Act 22 and the constitutional

right of privacy. 23 A surrogate, however, may assert a patient's right
to refuse treatment only by virtue of the patient's right of privacy.24
First, the Natural Death Act will be examined as a basis for refusing
medical treatment.
A.

The California Natural Death Act

California statutory law gives an adult the right to refuse medical
treatment. 25 The Natural Death Act2 6 provides a mechanism by which
a terminally ill person 2 may request that life-sustaining procedures2"
be withheld or withdrawn. The procedures may be withdrawn only
if the procedures merely serve to prolong the moment of death.29 Death
must be imminent whether or not the life-sustaining procedures are
utilized.30
The Natural Death Act contains the legislative finding that "adult
persons have the fundamental right to control the decisions relating
to the rendering of their own medical care, including the decision
to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances
of terminal condition."'" The patient must make a written directive
instructing his physicians to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
procedures.3 2 The Act, however, does not contain a provision by which
a third person may refuse medical treatment for an incapacitated
22. CAL. HEALTH & SAF=ry CODE §§7185-7195. See infra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
23. See Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225
(1984). Bartlingcites Barberto support the holding of the court that a competent, hospitalized
patient has the right to have a ventilator disconnected despite the fact that withdrawal of the
ventilator would hasten his death. Id. at 196-97, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226. See also infra notes
35-55 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
25. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§7185-7195.
26. Id.
27. "Terminal condition" is "an incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or illness,
which, regardless of the application of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable medical
judgment, produce death, and where the application of life-sustaining procedures serve only
to postpone the moment of death of the patient." Id. §7187(0.
28. "Life-sustaining procedure" is defined as "any medical procedure or intervention which
utilizes mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, restore, or supplant a vital function,
which, when applied to a qualified patient, would serve only to artificially prolong the moment
of death and where, in the judgment of the attending physician, death is imminent whether
or not such procedures are utilized." Id. §7178(c).
29. "Death" is defined as the irreversible cessation of the circulatory and respiratory systems
or the irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain. Id. at §7180.
30. Id. §7187(c).
31. Id. §7186.
32. Id. For the written format that must be used to direct a physician to remove lifesustaining devices, see id. §7188.
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patient.33 Only the patient himself may refuse treatment pursuant to
the Natural Death Act.34 Through the vicarious assertion of the
patient's right of privacy, however, a surrogate may accomplish the
same result, termination of life-sustaining treatment.
B.

The Right of Privacy

Courts have held that a patient may refuse to accept medical treatment because of the patient's constitutional right of privacy.35 Although
the United States Constitution does not describe a right of privacy
explicitly 36 the concept of the right of privacy first acquired constitutional dimensions in Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Olmstead
v. United States.37 Justice Brandeis wrote: "The protection guaranteed
by the Amendments

. .

. conferred, as against the Government, the

right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men. ' 38 The concept of a right of privacy
was developed further in Justice Douglas' dissent in Poe v. Lillman, 39
in which he argued that a right of privacy was implicit in a free
society.4" The right of privacy "emanates from the totality of the con' 41
stitutional scheme under which we live."
In 1965, the right of privacy was recognized by a majority of the
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut.4 2 In Griswold, the defendants were arrested for disseminating information regarding contraceptive devices to married persons.43 The Court held that the constitutional right of privacy prevented a state from prohibiting the dissemination of contraceptive information to married persons.44 The right of
33.

See id.§§7185-7195.

34.
35.

See id. §7188.
See, e.g., Satz, 362 So. 2d at 162; Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 424; Quinlan, 3555 A.2d

at 663-64.
36.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1972).

37. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The issue before the Court in Olmstead was whether evidence
of an incriminating telephone call secretly overheard by a government wire tap was admissible
in a criminal trial in federal court. Id. at 455. The Supreme Court held that use of this evidence
did not violate the defendant's fourth or fifth amendment rights and that the evidence therefore
was admissible. Id. at 455-59. This holding later was overruled by the Supreme Court in Katz

v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
38. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478.
39. 367 U.S. 497, 509-22 (1961). The Court dismissed the case that would have determined
whether a state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices and the giving of medical
advice as to the use of such devices was constitutional. Id. at 499-500. The Court found that

the state was not enforcing the prohibitory statute and thus the Court did not need to determine the statute's constitutionality. Id. at 502-08.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 521.
Id.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 480.

44. Id.at 485-86.
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privacy soon expanded to encompass areas other than dissemination
of contraceptive information. For example, in Roe v. Wade45 the
Supreme Court extended the right of privacy into the area of
abortion." The Court held that the right "is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy." ' 47 The right of privacy prevents a state from completely
prohibiting abortion. 8
In 1976, a court first extended the constitutional right of privacy
to include the right to refuse medical treatment.4 9 In In re Quinlan,"
the New Jersey Supreme Court stated, in language reminiscent of
Roe,' that the right of privacy ".... is broad enough to encompass
a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain
circumstances." 5 2 In Quinlan, the patient's guardian requested authority
from the court to remove life-support equipment from a comatose
patient. 3 The court assumed that without the life-support equipment
the patient soon would die.14 The patient's guardian was permitted
to withdraw the respiratory medical care by virtue of the patient's
right of privacy." The issue whether the patient's feeding tubes could
6
be withdrawn was not raised.1
Another example in which a patient's surrogate removed life-support
7
from a comatose patient was the case of Barber v. Superior Court.1
In Barber, however, the surrogate removing the life-support equipment also removed the patient's feeding and hydration tubes." Barber,
therefore, significantly departs from those cases allowing for removal
of medical treatment.

45. 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
46. Id. at 153.
47. Id.
48. Id. The right of privacy also has been recognized in several other kinds of cases. See,
e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (right of privacy in marriage); Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977) (right of privacy implicated in statute
prohibiting sale of contraceptives to minors); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)
(privacy interest in obscene materials in the home); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1365-66
(D. Mass. 1979) (mental patient's ability to refuse the administration of antipsychotic drugs).
49. See, e.g., Satz, 362 So. 2d at 162; Saikewiez, 370 N.E.2d at 424.
50. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
51. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (1972). See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
52. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663.
53. Id. at 662-63.
54. Id. at 665.
55. Id. at 671-72.
56. Id.
57. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484.
58. Id. at 1010-11, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
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THE Barber DECisION
In Barber v. Superior Court," a patient was hospitalized for routine

abdominal surgery." Following the surgery, the patient went into cardiorespiratory arrest 6 ' and soon thereafter fell into a deep comatose
state.62 Although the patient retained some minimal brain activity63
and thus was not brain dead," the patient's doctors concluded that
the patient would remain in a permanent vegetative state.65
After being told of the prognosis by the attending physicians, the
patient's wife and family requested that all machines sustaining the
patient's life be removed. 6 Accordingly, the doctors first removed
the respirator and other life-sustaining machines; but the patient continued to live.6 7 The doctors then ordered the removal of the
intravenous tubes that provided food and water. 6 A short time later
the patient died, not from the effects of the cardiorespiratory arrest,
but from dehydration.69
The physicians were charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder.7" The Court of Appeal issued a writ prohibiting the
Superior Court from taking any further action on the charges,' stating
that a person either may accept or reject the use of life-support equipment that maintains his existence. 71 The administration of nourish59. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
60. Id. at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1013, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
64. See supra note 29. The patient in Barber did have some brain activity and his circulatory and respiratory systems were functioning. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1013, 195 Cal.

Rptr. at 488. The patient was not dead according to California Health and Safety Code section
7180.
65.
66.
67.
68.

69.

Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.

Steinbock, The Removal of Mr. Herbert's Feeding Tube, 13 HAsrIos CENTER REP.

12, 14 (Oct. 1983).

During the presentation of the Barber case, the prosecution suggested that the patient was
not, or was not known to be, permanently comatose when the intravenous tubes were removed.
Id. at 13. The prosecution claimed that had the tubes not been removed, the patient might
have recovered. Id.
A neurological expert called by the prosecution claimed that he believed the patient had a

"good chance" of recovery. Id. at 14. Two other experts claimed that a doctor must wait
at least two weeks after a person has entered a persistent vegetative state before a determination can be made with reasonable medical certainty that the patient's condition is hopeless. Id.
A nursing supervisor first balked when told to remove the patient's respirator and feeding
tubes. Id. at 13. When the patient died as a result of the removal of the tubes, the supervisor's
reaction was, "God, you mean if you don't wake up in three days this can happen to you?" Id.
70.

Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.

71.

Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 494.

72.

Id. at 1015-16, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
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ment through intravenous tubes was held to be legally equivalent to
the use of a respirator or other forms of life-support treatment.7 3 Since
a respirator may be withdrawn from a comatose patient and because
food and hydration is the equivalent of other life-support
methods7 4
75
removed.
be
may
also
tubes
feeding and hydration
The Barber court believed that food was the equivalent of other
life-support systems because feeding a patient intravenously is more
similar to medical procedures than to typical human ways of eating.7 6
The court contended that intravenous feeding should not be classified
as either ordinary or extraordinary care, 77 but that feeding tubes may
be disconnected when a patient has little chance for a return to sapient
life.7 8 Since food was the equivalent of medical care and because the
patient had little chance for recovery," the appellate court prohibited
the lower court from taking any criminal action against the doctors
who disconnected the feeding tubes.8"
Although the Barber court determined that the administration of
food was the legal equivalent of the administration of medical care,
many courts have treated food and medical care dissimilarly.8 ' Some
courts have held that food is not the same as medical treatment and
that a patient may not refuse food and hydration."2 This was the
decision of Judge Hews of the California Superior Court in the recent
case concerning Elizabeth Bouvia. s3

A

PATIENT CANNOT REFUSE FOOD

The question whether a hospitalized patient may refuse food and
water was placed squarely before the superior court when twenty-six
year old Elizabeth Bouvia requested that the court enjoin the hospital

73. Id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1016-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490-91.
76. Id.at 1016-17, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
77. Id. at 1018-19, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491. If a court classifies treatment as ordinary care,
the treatment is considered obligatory. See infra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
78. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1018-19, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491-92.
79. The opinion of the court does indicate, however, that the patient had a chance for
some degree of recovery. Id. at 1020, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492. The court stated that the patient
may have remained in a vegetative state or improved to full recovery. Id. at 1020, 195 Cal.
Rptr. at 492. The chances for unimpaired recovery, however, were miniscule. Id. See also supra
note 69 and accompanying text.
80. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1023, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493-94.
81. See, e.g., Conroy, 464 A.2d at 311; Von Holden v. Chapman, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623,
627 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
82. Chapman, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
83. Cox, Lawyers, Doctors Back Court's Ban On Patient'sDeath, L.A. Daily J., Dec.
19, 1983 at 1, col. 6.
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where she was a patient from forcing her to accept food and water. 4
Bouvia, who was a quadraplegic suffering from cerebral palsy,8 5 had
decided that she would rather die than face life dependent on others
for her survival. 86 Bouvia checked into a hospital and asked the hospital
administrators to permit her to starve to death and to ease her way
with hygienic care and pain-killing drugs.87 Upon the refusal of hospital
personnel to participate in Bouvia's attempt to kill herself, Bouvia
sought to enjoin the hospital from administering food to her.88 A
California superior court refused to order the hospital to allow Bouvia
to starve to death. 9 In fact, the judge ordered that should Bouvia
try to refuse food, the hospital was permitted to force-feed her. 90 Thus,
the court concluded that a hospitalized patient had no right to refuse
food.9"
Had the court determined that intravenous food and water were
merely forms of medical treatment, the court would have evaluated
Bouvia's request differently. A patient may refuse medical treatment
by virtue of the constitutional right of privacy. 9 If food and water
were the legal equivalent of medical care, as the Barber court stated, 9"
Bouvia could have refused intravenous feeding.94 The Bouvia court,
however, concluded that the administration of food was not the legal
equivalent of the administration of medical treatment and, therefore,
Bouvia had no right to refuse food while in the hospital. 9 The refusal
of food and water was viewed as an act of suicide. 96 Since the patient
had no right to commit suicide, 97 she had no right to ask the hospital
84. Cox, Disabled Woman's Request to Die Raises Legal Furor, L.A. Daily J., Dec. 8,
1983, at 1, col. 6.
85. Id.
86. L.A. Daily J., Dec. 23, 1983, at 14, col. 5.
87. Cox, supra note 84, at 1, col. 6.
88. Id.
89. Cox, supra note 83, at 1, col. 6.
90. L.A. Daily J., Dec. 23, 1983, at 14, col. 5. Bouvia was subjected to force-feeding
until she checked out of the hospital. See L.A. Daily J., Dec. 28, 1983. She has since decided
that she wishes to live and is no longer seeking death. N.Y. Times, April 24, 1984, §A, p.
14, col. 1.
91. See Cox, supra note 83, at I col. 6. The Bouvia court, however, gave no reason why

a patient may not refuse food other than to declare that the refusal of food is suicide. See id.
92.
93.

See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.

94. Bouvia could have refused medical treatment by virtue of her constitutional right of
privacy. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
95. L.A. Daily J., Dec. 23, 1983, at 14, col. 5.

96. Id.
97. California Penal Code section 401 holds any person who deliberately aids, advises,
or encourages another to commit suicide guilty of a felony. The court in Chapman, 450 N.Y.S.2d
623, stated that the constitutional right of privacy did not include the right to commit suicide.

Id. at 625. "To characterize a person's self-destructive acts as entitled to that constitutional
protection would be ludicrous." Id. at 625.
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to assist her in that act.9" Other states, besides California, have been
requested to permit a patient to refuse food. The New York decision
of Von Holden v. Chapman99 is another illustration of a refusal by
a court to allow a person to starve himself to death under a claim
of a constitutional right of privacy.
A.

Von Holden v. Chapman

In Von Holden v. Chapman, the court examined whether a prisoner
should be allowed to starve himself to death.' 0 Mark Chapman, the
killer of former Beatle John Lennon, was committed to the psychiatric
ward of Attica State Prison.'"' To protest his commitment, Chapman
attempted to starve himself to death. 2 A New York trial court
authorized the facility director to sustain Chapman's life by
force-feeding. 0 3 Chapman appealed this order to the New York
appellate court."'
Chapman claimed that under the constitutionally protected right
of privacy, a person must be allowed to refuse life-prolonging medical
care.'0 5 Chapman contended that because food also would prolong
his life, he therefore also had a constitutional right to refuse
nourishment. 1 6 Chapman believed that his right of privacy should
enable him to refuse all treatment that would tend to prolong his
life, including the administration of food. 107
The court rejected Chapman's claim that the right of privacy entitled
him to starve himself to death0 8 holding instead that the refusal of
food was suicide and could not be condoned.0 9 The refusal of medical
treatment, however, was not tantamount to suicide." 0 The court stated:
98.

Cox, supra note 83, at 1, col. 6. Recently, at the University Medical Center in

Sacramento, California, a twenty-eight year old anorexic patient charged the hospital with holding
and treating her against her will. Powell, State Investigating Anorexic's Charges, Sacramento
Bee, Apr. 11, 1984, B3, col. 1. After the patient checked into the hospital for treatment for
anorexia, she was placed under a conservatorship as "gravely disabled" and unable to sustain
her life if released. Id. The State Department of Health investigated the case and found that
the hospital had acted appropriately. Id. The Department determined that once a patient is
admitted, the hospital must provide the patient with adequate food and water. Id. The patient

has not taken the matter to court. Id.
99. 450 N.Y.S.2d 623.
100. Id. at 624, 625.
101. Id. at 624.
102. Id. at 625.
103. Id. at 624.

104. Id.at 625.
105.

Id. at 626.

106. Id.at 625-27.
107. Id.

108.
109.
110.

Id.at 626-27.
Id.
Id.
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"Even superficial comparison of the right to decline medical treatment with the right to take one's life [by starvation] illustrates their
essential dissimilarity and to argue that because the State has recognized
the former it must permit the latter would be to engage in the most
specious reasoning.""'
While Chapman could have refused medical treatment," 2 food was
not medical treatment." 3 The Bouvia and Chapman cases demonstrate
that courts do not treat the administration of medical treatment and
the administration of food in the same manner. In both cases, medical
treatment could have been refused."' In neither case, however, was
'5
the refusal of food allowed.
The problem becomes more difficult when the patient would choose
starvation, but is unable because the patient is incapacitated. Courts
continue to treat the administration of medical care and food
dissimilarly when a surrogate attempts to refuse food on a patient's
behalf."16 In the case of In re Conroy,"' a New Jersey superior court
refused to permit the guardian of a hospitalized incompetent patient
to remove feeding tubes on the patient's behalf." 8
A SURROGATE MAY NOT REFUSE FOOD ON A PATIENT's BEHALF

Claire Conroy was a nursing home patient suffering from organic
brain syndrome."19 She was unable to swallow sufficient amounts of
food and water for her own sustenance and, therefore, was nourished
through a feeding tube.'2 0 Although her brain functioned at a primitive
level, Conroy had no cognitive ability."' The medical diagnosis was

inconclusive as to whether she was capable of experiencing pain.' 22

Conroy was neither comatose, nor brain dead, nor in a chronic
vegetative state.' 23 The doctors had no reasonable expectation that
Conroy's prognosis would ever improve or that she would ever return

111. Id. at 627. The court, however, did not analyze the reasons why the right to decline
medical treatment is different from the right to refuse food. See id. at 112. Chapman, like
Bouvia, could have refused medical treatment by virtue of his constitutional right of privacy.

See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
113.
114.

Chapman, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 626-27.
See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.

115.

See supra notes 84-98 and 100-13 and accompanying text.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See, e.g., Conroy, 464 A.2d at 315.
464 A.2d 303 (N.J. 1983).
Id. at 306, 307.
Id. at 304.
Id.
See id. at 304-05.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 304-05.
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to a cognitive and sapient state."' None of Conroy's medical conditions were fatal and her physicians could not predict when, or from
what cause, she would die.' 25
Conroy was declared incompetent, and her nephew was appointed
as her guardian.' 26 The guardian asked the nursing home to remove
the nasogastric feeding tube,' 27 but was refused. The guardian then
sought a judicial declaration that he, the guardian, had the right to
cause the tube to be removed claiming that he knew the patient's
values and preferences' 28 and that she never would consent to this
29
type of feeding voluntarily.
Following a plenary trial, the trial court ordered removal of Conroy's
nasogastric tube. 3 ' Pending appeal of that order, however, a stay
was granted.' Reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeal found
that the administration of food and water through the nasogastric
tube was not medical treatment that could be refused by a third
person.' 3 2 According to the court, nutrition was a basic necessity of
life that could not have been withdrawn by either the hospital or the
guardian.'33 Even though the court concluded that Conroy would have
chosen to terminate medical treatment had she been able to,'34 Conroy
herself could not have refused food and, therefore, her guardian could
not have refused it for her."'
Other courts, in addition to the Conroy court,' 36 have stated that
although food is a basic necessity, life-support systems such as
respirators are not basic necessities.' 37 Medical experts often will classify
medical care as either ordinary or extraordinary care, 3 ' classifying
3
food as ordinary care and life-support systems as extraordinary care.'19
This distinction between ordinary and extraordinary care is further
evidence that the administration of food should not be treated as the
equivalent of the administration of medical treatment.
124. See id. at 305.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 305.
Id. at 304.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 306, n.4.
See id. at 304, 315.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 306, n. 4.
See id.at 311, 313-15.
Id. at 303.
See, e.g., Barry, 445 So. 2d at 368-69.
See D. VA.ToN, ETHics OF WrrHDRAwAL oF LwE-SuppoRT SYSTEMS 222-26 (1983).
See, e.g., Conroy, 464 A.2d at 312.
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A.

Ordinary and Extraordinary Care

The characterization of care as ordinary or extraordinary determines
whether the care is obligatory or discretionary.' The definitions of
ordinary and extraordinary care, however, are fluid and depend on
the nature of the treatment and the patient's prognosis.' 4 ' This fluid
definition led the Barber court to state that characterization as either
ordinary or extraordinary begs the question.'4 2 Nevertheless, in cases
in which a characterization has been made by a court, the administration of food has been determined to be ordinary or normal care, and,
therefore, obligatory.' 3
In the recent case of In re Barry,'" a Florida appellate court
authorized the removal of a life-support system from an infant who
was in a chronic permanent vegetative coma.' 5 The infant had no
cognitive brain function and was terminally ill.' 6 The court order
authorized the parents to cause the ventilator life-support system to
be terminated and instructed the attending physicians not to furnish
life-sustaining procedures thereafter except for the sole purpose of
alleviating the child's pain and suffering and to keep him comfortable and provide him with "normal nutrition."'4 7 The court considered
nutrition to be a normal part of the care required for a comatose
patient while waiting for him to die.14 8
In sum, courts traditionally have distinguished between the removal
of food and water and the withdrawal of life-support systems. In
Bouvia, the court refused to allow a hospitalized patient to refuse
food in order to starve herself to death.'p 9 The New Jersey court in
140.

Lynn and Childress, Must PatientsAlways be Given Food and Water?, 13 HASTINGS

CENTER REP. 17, 19 (Oct. 1983).

141. One definition of ordinary care is: "[A]II medicines, treatment, and operations which
offer a reasonable hope of benefit and which can be obtained and used without excessive expense, pain, or other inconvenience." Conroy, 464 A.2d at 312. "Extraordinary measures are
complicated methods. They are impossible for the patieint to use or apply by himself and pre-

sent a costly and difficult burden... [T]hey represent a high level of danger, and the results

are not predictable, i.e., the effectiveness is minimal or moderate while the dangers are max-

imal." Id.
142.

See Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1018, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.

143. See, e.g., Barry, 445 So. 2d at 368-69. The ad-hoc committee on Ethics and Survival
stated that a hospital standing committee organized to determine when medical care should

be terminated should give due deliberation to petitions for cessation of extraordinary care.
Waldman, Medical Ethics and Hopelessly Ill Child, 88 J. PED. 890, 892 (1976). The ad-hoc

committee, however, distinguished between extraordinary and ordinary care stating that
ordinary care was comprised of foods, fluids, oxygen, antibiotics, and pain killers. Id.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

445 So. 2d 365.
Id. at 367.
Id.
Id. at 369.
See id.

149.

See supra notes 84-98 and accompanying text.
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Conroy would not permit a surrogate to order a nursing home to
withdraw food from a patient, holding that food was not the equivalent
of medical treatment.' 0 Courts also have distinguished between food
and medical treatment by characterizing food as ordinary care and
medical treatment as extraordinary care and have allowed the discontinuance of extraordinary care but have refused to allow the withdrawl
of ordinary care.' 5 ' This is in contrast to the Barber decision which
held that food was the equivalent of medical care.' 52 Although Bouvia,
Chapman, and Conroy demonstrate that courts view medical treatment and food differently, in none of these cases did the court analyze
or describe the differences between withholding medical care and
withholding food. The courts simply state that medicine and food
are dissimilar' 5 3 or characterize food as ordinary care and therefore
obligatory.' 5 4 The final section of this comment, therefore, will discuss
the policy reasons why, contrary to the holding of the Barber court,
courts should continue to distinguish between food and medical treatment and not permit the withdrawal of food or water from a living
patient.
POLICY REASONS FOR THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
FOOD AND MEDICAL TREATMENT

Ethics scholars have postulated a variety of reasons why food should
be distinguished from medical treatment in the determination of what
types of medical care morally can be withdrawn from patients.' 5
Among the reasons postulated are the distinction between passively
allowing a patient to die and actively killing the patient,' 56 and the
tutioristic desire' 57 to provide a clear line to determine what type of
care may be withdrawn from a patient.' 5'
A.

Tutiorism

The essential principle of tutiorism is that obedience to established
law generally is better and safer than liberal experimentation when
150. 464 A.2d at 311.
151. See supra notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
152. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
153. See Chapman, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627; see also Conroy, 464 A.2d at 311.
154. See Barry, 445 So. 2d at 369; see also Conroy, 464 A.2d at 312.
155. See, e.g., Callahan, On Feeding the Dying, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 22 (Oct. 1983);
Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN.
L. REv. 969 (1958); Lynn and Childress, supra note 139, at 17.
156. See infra notes 168-79 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
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error may involve moral costs.' 9 Tutiorism expounds the theory that
a set of standards is necessary to ensure that a patient with any chance
for recovery will not be actively killed. 160 If a patient has a remote
chance of recovery, tutiorism dictates that a passive course of conduct be followed.' 6 '
Doctors often are unable to determine the causes of disease or
whether an "incurable" patient will live or die. 62 Doctors are fallible
and capable of misdiagnosing the patient's chances for recovery. 63
When life and death are at stake, tutiorism dictates that any error
must always be made on the side of life.
Courts should continue as a matter of policy to order that even
comatose patients receive food and water not only because courts
should err on the side of life, but also because this policy provides
a clear dividing line. If the tutioristic approach is not adopted, the
consequence may be that killing comatose patients will become more
accepted and commonplace.' 6 Approval of the taking of a patient's
life could set a dangerous precedent; once removal of feeding tubes
is condoned, further steps in deciding who should live and who should
die is an easier step to take. 165 If a court deems that a comatose patient
should not live, and doctors are allowed to actively take the lives
of their patients, it is difficult to know at what point this precedent
will end. 66 If, however, courts refuse to allow feeding tubes to be
removed from comatose patients, a bright line of certainty will be
established.' 67 Doctors will know what type of medical care may be
withdrawn from what type of patient. Without such a line, doctors
will find themselves in a quandary as to when the removal of feeding
tubes is permitted.
B.

Passive/Active Conduct

Philosophers distinguish between actively taking a life and passively
159.

D. Walton, supra note 137, at 82.

160. See id. at 81.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Kennedy, The Problem of Social Control of the Congenital Defective, 99 Am. J.
PSYcHIATRY 13, 14 (1942).
164. See Kamisar, supra note 155, at 1030.
165. Id.
166. Id. The defendants in Barber waited five days from the time the patient suffered a
cardiorespiratory arrest until the time the doctors disconnected the feeding tubes. 147 Cal. App.
3d at 1010-11, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. Some have contended that the active termination of
the chronically ill in Nazi Germany eventually led to the extermination camps of World War
11. See Kamisar, supr'a note 154, at 1031-37.
167. See Kamiser, supra note 155, at 1037-38.
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allowing a patient to live or die. 6 ' The difference between actively
taking a life and allowing a patient to live or die is subtle and often
difficult to grasp in the circumstances of a comatose patient. Actively
taking a life entails engaging in conduct that necessarily results in
the termination of the life of another; there is no alternative
outcome." 9 Conversely, passively allowing a patient to live or die contemplates not committing an act that necessarily terminates the life
of another.' 70 Passive conduct allows for two possible alternative outcomes; the patient may either live or die.' 7 ' Taking a patient off a
respirator may in fact allow that person to die, but this line of conduct also may be compatible with the patient's continued survival.' 72
For example, in the Quinlan case the removal of Karen Quinlan's
respirator was authorized although the court believed that without
the respirator Karen Quinlan would die.'" The doctors, by disconnecting the respirator, engaged in a passive act because the patient
could have either lived or died after disconnection.' 7 Because the doctors in Quinlan only engaged in passive acts, Karen Quinlan continues
7
to live today. 1
In contrast, when a physician disconnects a feeding tube, the patient
will die just as surely as if the doctor had shot the patient.' 76 Removing a feeding tube is necessarily incompatible with the patient's
survival.' Food, unlike respiration, is never self-generating and must
always come from a source outside the patient's own body. The disconnection of feeding tubes does not allow for alternative outcomes; the
patient's death is assured.'78 Because the disconnection of feeding tubes
necessarily results in the termination of the patient's life, the physicians disconnecting the tubes have actively caused the patient to die.' 7 9
This is unlike the passive tutioristic approach that does not foreclose
the possible alternative result of life.
168. D. WALTON, supra note 138, at 228-37. See also Kary, A Moral Distinction Between
Killing and Letting Die, 5 J. OF MEDICRE AND PmiosoPHw 326, 328-32 (1980). Killing someone
is morally reprehensible, whereas letting someone die is-not necessarily so. Id.
169. D. WALTON, supra note 138, at 234-35.
170. Id. at 234-36.
171. Id.

172. Id.at 236.
173. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 655.
174. See D. WALTON, supra note 138 at 236.
175. 70 A.B.A.J. 29-30 (Feb. 1984).
176. The withdrawal of treatment may be equated with thrusting a scalpel into the patient's
heart. See D. WALTON, supra note 138 at 228.

177.

See id.at 236.

178. Id.
179. Id. at 234-36. Douglas Walton, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Winnipeg,
gives the example of a Captain Oates to illustrate the difference between an event which causes

death with no possibility of intervening occurrences preventing death, and letting death occur
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CONCLUSION

This author has demonstrated that a patient may terminate the
administration of medical care by virtue of either the California Natural
Death Act or the patient's constitutional right of privacy. When a
patient is incompetent or incapacitated, a third person may assert the
right to refuse medical care on behalf of the patient. The patient or
the patient's surrogate may terminate medical care even when denying care will, in all likelihood, result in the patient's death.
The Barber court, in a criminal setting, held that the administration of food and water was the equivalent of the administration of
medical care. Since a patient may refuse medical care, and because
Barber held that food and water was the equivalent of medical care,
a patient or his surrogate may refuse food and water. A doctor disconnecting a comatose patient's feeding and hydration tubes at the request
of the patient's surrogate will not be subject to criminal liability.
In holding that the administration of food was legally equivalent
to the administration of medical treatment, the Barber court departed
from traditional analysis. Courts have not permitted hospitalized
patients to refuse food and water. Instead, courts have held that the
refusal of food is not the same as the refusal of medical treatment,
but rather, the refusal of food is the equivalent of suicide. A patient's
constitutional right of privacy does not give a patient the right to
starve to death. Since a patient has no right to commit suicide, the
patient has no right to ask a hospital to help the patient commit
suicide. Neither may a surrogate refuse food on a patient's behalf.
The difference between food and medical treatment is evidenced
further by the distinction made by courts between ordinary and
extraordinary care. Extraordinary care is considered to be optional;
the physician may choose to authorize the withdrawal of extraordinary
care. Ordinary care, on the other hand, is obligatory; a doctor may
not authorize the withdrawal of ordinary care. Food has been
by allowing for alternative events. Id. at 230-31. Captain Oates and his friends were trapped
in a blizzard when Captain Oates walked to certain death into the blizzard to give his friends
a better chance of survival. Id. at 230. Captain Oates, however, had a revolver and therefore
could have shot himself in order to remove himself from the group. Id. If Captain Oates had
shot himself, this would have constituted suicide. Id. at 231-32. The question that Walton poses
is whether walking into the blizzard would also be active suicide since in all probability the
result would be the same. Id.
Walton claims that the difference between Captain Oates walking into the blizzard and shooting
himself is that walking into the blizzard allows for alternative events that could save Captain
Oates. Id. For example, the Mounties may discover and save him. Id. at 232. If, however,
Captain Oates shot himself, there would be no intervening events which could spare his life.
Id. Thus, this illustrates the difference between actively seeking a death and passively allowing
death to occur. Id. at 230-33.
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characterized by the courts as ordinary care and therefore may not
be withdrawn.
The Barber court also ignored the policy reasons behind
distinguishing food and water from medical treatment. A distinction
may be made between intentionally causing a patient's death and allowing the patient to either live or die. When food is withdrawn, the
patient's death is assured. Since food is never self-generated, the
withdrawal of food is necessarily incompatible with the patient's continued survival. When medical care such as a respirator is removed,
the patient may either live or die. Thus, the alternative outcome of
life is allowed and the doctor has not intentionally killed as is the
case when food is denied.
In addition, physicians must be discouraged from actively taking
lives. Once a court determines that a comatose patient should not
live, standards determining which type of patient will be denied food
and water will be difficult to set. Holding that food and water may
never be withheld from a living patient provides a bright line of certainty. The holding of the Barber court, that the administration of
food and water is the equivalent to the administration of medical care
is, therefore, erroneous.
This author has presented the essential differences between the
administration of medical care and the administration of food and
water and the policy reasons behind those differences. The Barber
decision should be limited to the facts presented in the case and should
not be used as precedent. A court should not permit the denial of
food and water to a comatose patient.
Stephen Mark Harber
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